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STOP THE PRESSES! FIRST
AMENDMENT LIMITATIONS OF
PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES'
PUBLICITY RIGHTS
INTRODUCTION
Every article, whether for a legal journal or a popular magazine, needs an
attention getting illustration. However, when the article's subject deals with
professional athletes, the author must choose the illustration carefully. One
wrong word could infringe upon the athletes' rights.
This article explores the professional athlete's right of publicity as limited
by the media's First Amendment rights of freedom of speech, press, and
information. "The right of publicity is a relatively new legal concept ' 1 and
arguably a rapidly growing area of legal theory as celebrities, including
professional athletes, strive to protect what may be their most valuable asset:
themselves.2
This article will begin with a general discussion of the right of publicity.
This section will define the right of publicity and detail its origins and
development as a legal theory in general. The next section of this article will
focus on the application of these publicity rights to professional athletes
(exclusive of applications to amateur athletes), to amateur and professional
athletic teams or franchises, and to leagues, conferences and governing bodies.
In the next section the specific limitations imposed by the First Amendment on
publicity rights will be addressed.
Finally, this article will examine the current state of professional athletes'
publicity rights as limited by the First Amendment. I will argue that current
case law fails to delineate a clear standard for First Amendment protection of
the communication of events and performances related to professional
athletes-in other words, the use of a professional athlete's likeness. This in
turn fails to clearly establish when professional athletes may claim a right to
1. ALEXANDER LINDEY, LINDEY ON ENTERTAINMENT PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS:
AGREEMENTS AND THE LAW § 12.01(l) (2d ed. Supp. 2000).
2. Laura Lee Stapleton & Matt McMurphy, The Professional Athlete's Right of Publicity, 10
MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 23, 24 (1999) (citing Marcia Chambers, Lawsuit Pits Artists' Rights vs. Athletes,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1999, at ID).
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profit from their likenesses and abilities or achievements. I will also argue
that the current case law distinctions of protected speech based upon
classification of the "style" of the use of the likeness is inadequate. The
distinction of protected speech should be based upon the classification of the
medium in which the likeness appears.
I. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY--GENERALLY
Simply stated, the right of publicity "is the inherent right of every human
being to control the commercial use of his or her identity."'3 As such, "[t]he
right of publicity is not merely a legal right of the 'celebrity,' but is a right
inherent to everyone to control the commercial use of [his] identity and
persona and recover in court damages and the commercial value of an
unpermitted taking." 4
The right of publicity initially emerged and developed within the law of
privacy. 5 The origins of the right of privacy stem from an 1890 law review
article by Louis Brandeis and Charles Warren. 6 Warren and Brandeis
envisioned a common law right of privacy as "preventing truthful but intrusive
and embarrassing disclosures by the press"-essentially, the right to be left
alone. 7
Later, and in this context, commentator William Prosser conceived his
theory of the "four torts of privacy," which stated that "'privacy' was not a
unified concept, but consisted of a cluster of four quite distinct torts." 8
Essentially, the right of privacy developed into a personal right including the
right to be let alone and the right "to live quietly, to be free from unwarranted
intrusion, [and] to protect [one's] name and personality from
commercialization." 9
Specifically, Prosser's four torts of privacy consisted of: 1) "invasion of
privacy by intrusion[-]... 'privacy' is invaded by physical intrusion upon the
plaintiffs seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs[;]" 10  2) "public
3. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIvACY § 1:3 (2d ed., rev. vol.
2001).
4. Id. (emphasis added).
5. Id. § 1:7.
6. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION § 28:3 (4th
ed., rev. 2000) (citing Charles Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890)).
7. Id.
8. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 1:19.
9. LINDEY, supra note 1, § 12.01(1).
10. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 1:20.
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disclosure of private facts[-] ... the public disclosure of embarrassing private
facts about the plaintiff[;] ' 1 3) "false light privacy[-] ... to present plaintiff
to the public in a 'false light[;]""' 12 and finally, 4) "invasion of privacy by
appropriation[-] [the] unpermitted use, usually for commercial purposes, of...
identity, with damage to... dignitary interests and peace of mind.' 13 The
fourth prong represents the foundation for the right of publicity. 14
In this context the original right of publicity cases were brought as cases
of invasion of the right of privacy based upon "the indignity and personal
affront of having one's name or face widely used to sell a product without
permission."' 5 This was different from the traditional right of privacy cases in
which an individual claims a right to be let alone. Based on this distinction,
courts often found it difficult to reconcile a celebrity's claim for redress for
unauthorized use of his picture in advertising when he himself had "sought
[out] such attention and profited from it."'16
For instance, an early right of publicity case was presented as an invasion
of an athlete's right of privacy by appropriation. 17 A claim was made by
football player David O'Brien that Pabst Brewery's use of his picture in a
calendar associated with Pabst beer caused him mental distress by means of
embarrassment and humiliation.18 O'Brien was a celebrated college and
professional football player and a member of the Allied Youth of America,
whose major goal was to rid young people of alcohol. 19 As such, O'Brien
claimed he was embarrassed and humiliated by the allegedly false impression
conveyed by the calendar that he used and endorsed the use of beer.20 Not
only did the court find no such false impression in the calendar images, but
also it had difficulty finding O'Brien had even suffered an invasion of privacy,
since "the publicity he got was only that which he had been constantly seeking
and receiving." 21
Since the law of privacy was proving to be an inadequate basis upon
which to regulate the appropriation of one's identity, courts began to analyze
11. Id. § 1:21.
12. Id. § 1:22.
13. Id. § 1:23.
14. Id.
15. MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 28:3.
16. Stapleton & McMurphy, supra note 2, at 27 (citing PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS,
SPORTS AND THE LAW 422 (2d ed. 1998)).
17. O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 823 (1942).
18. Id. at 168-69.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 169-70.
21. Id. at 170.
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publicity rights in the context of property rights.22  For instance, Haelan
Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.23 addressed the consequences
of the different analyses of one's right of privacy in one's publicity value and
of one's "property" right in that publicity value.24 Also, Haelan presented the
first judicial recognition of an independent right of publicity.25 Here, Haelan
claimed to have exclusive contracts with leading baseball players for the use
of their photographs in production of Haelan's baseball trading cards and that
Topps tortiously interfered with those contracts.26
The court found New York's statutory right of privacy was a personal
right and thus limited the ballplayers' contracts to mere releases of liability
and did not vest property or other legal interests in the plaintiff.27 The court
went on to find:
[I]n addition to and independent of that [personal and non-assignable]
right of privacy.., a man has a right in the publicity value of his
photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing
his picture....
This right might be called a 'right of publicity.' For it is common
knowledge that many prominent persons (especially actors and ball-
players), far from having their feelings bruised through public
exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no
longer received money for authorizing advertisements, popularizing
their countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines, busses, trains
and subways. This right of publicity would usually yield them no
money unless it could be made the subject of an exclusive grant that
barred any other advertiser from using their pictures.28
With this decision commentator Melville Nimmer observed that:
what the celebrity want[s] [is] not protection against unreasonable
intrusion into privacy, but a right to control the commercial value of
identity: ... [His] concern is rather with publicity, ... [he does not]
wish to have his name, photograph, and likeness reproduced and
publicized without his consent or without remuneration to him."29
22. Stapleton & McMurphy, supra note 2, at 26.
23. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
24. Id. at 868.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 867.
27. Id.
28. Haelan Labs., 202 F.2d at 868.
29. MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 28:4 (citing Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19
[Vol. 12:885
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Nimmer acutely articulated the difficulty in co-mingling privacy and
publicity rights: They differ significantly since privacy rights assure the right
to be let alone whereas publicity rights assure the right to profit from one's
self. Therefore, with Judge Frank's Haelan decision 30 as a basis, "Nimmer
designed and built the foundation of a new intellectual property right-the
right of publicity."31 Therefore, by 1953 when Haelan was decided,32 the
common law recognized that celebrities had a right to profit from the use of
their likeness, distinct from their right to be let alone.33
Since its "official" judicial recognition in 1953, "the right of publicity
[now] exists in some form [in a majority of states.]" 34 While in many states
publicity rights remain a creature of the common law, some states have
enacted specific right of publicity statutes. 35 Despite these explicit state
recognitions of the right of publicity, no parallel federal legislation exists.
However, the right of publicity has secured distinct treatment in the
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition.36 The Restatement uniformly
applies the right of publicity in the context of "appropriation of the
commercial value of a person's identity.... One who appropriates the
commercial value of a person's identity by using without consent the person's
name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of trade is subject to
liability for the relief appropriate. '37 Essentially, the Restatement allows a
person to be compensated when another person or entity profits from that
use.
38
With this general definition of the right of publicity from the Restatement,
a prima facie case for infringement of the right of publicity can be made by
pleading and proving the basic elements of validity and infringement of the
right:
1. Validity. Plaintiff owns an enforceable right in the identity or
persona of a human being.
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 203-04 (1954)).
30. Haelan Labs., 202 F.2d at 866.
31. MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 28:4 (citing J. Thomas McCarthy, Melville B. Nimmer and the
Right ofPublicity: A Tribute, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1703, 1712 (1987)).
32. Haelan Labs., 202 F.2d at 866.
33. Stapleton & McMurphy, supra note 2, at 26.
34. Id. at 32.
35. Id. (citing J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY & PRIVACY, § 6.1 [B] at 6-6 to
6-8, § 6.3[A] at 6-13 to 6-15 (Rev. 1999)).
36. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 46-49 (1995).
37. Id. § 46.
38. Id. §49.
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2. Infringement.
A.Defendant, without permission, has used some aspect of identity
or persona in such a way that plaintiff is identifiable from defendant's
use.
B.Defendant's use is likely to cause damage to the commercial
value of that persona. 39
Commentator J. Thomas McCarthy theorizes that the issue of validity will
rarely be the critical issue, so long as the right of a human being is asserted
and not the right of a "corporation, partnership, institution or animal. '40 Since
"person" is unqualified, every human being maintains a right to profit from his
own person; thus, when one claims a violation of his right of publicity it will
rarely be contested that he does not in fact have a right to be compensated for
a use of his likeness. By default, then, the second element, infringement, will
usually be the critical issue in determining an infringement of the right of
publicity.
The test for infringement is "identifiability [of the persona].., and not
confusion as to endorsement."'41 Therefore, the only thing necessary for
infringement to occur is that the likeness is identifiable as the person;
infringement does not require that the use imply that the person whose
likeness is used endorses a product or service. The broad term "persona"
encompasses not only the traditional name or physical likeness, but has
expanded to include other attributes.42 For example, courts have recognized
claims for infringement of celebrities' publicity rights based upon the
identifiability of persona by: look-alike,43 distinctive voice or sound-alike,44
"[p]hrase [a]ssociated with [c]elebrity, ' 45 and "[c]haracter [p]ortrayed by
[c]elebrity, 46 amongst others which will be discussed in detail in the following
39. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, §§ 3:2-3:3 (citations omitted).
40. Id. § 3:3 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
41. Stapleton & McMurphy, supra note 2, at 35-36.
42. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 4:45.
43. Arlen W. Langvardt, The Troubling Implications of a Right of Publicity "Wheel" Spun Out of
Control, 45 KAN. L. REv. 329, 362-66 (1997) (citing as examples Onassis v. Christian Dior-New
York, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1984), affd, 110 A.D.2d 1095 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985); Allen v.
National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)).
44. Id. at 366-84 (citing Lahr v. Adell Chemical Co., 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962); Sinatra v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971); Midler
v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988); Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1080 (1993)).
45. Id. at 388-90 (citing Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir.
1983).
46. Id. at 391-99 (citing McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912 (3d Cir. 1994)).
[Vol. 12:885
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sections.
Thus, with its origins in common law privacy rights, the right of publicity
has developed into a common law property right in the persona of a human
being. A variety of characteristics can identify a persona and implicate an
infringement of publicity rights.
II. PUBLICITY RIGHTS OF PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES
This section will explore the specific scope of professional athletes' rights
of publicity. This effectively excludes from consideration the publicity rights
of amateur athletes as well as those of amateur and professional athletic teams
or franchises, leagues, conferences and governing bodies. Overall, the
development of professional athletes' publicity rights mirror those of the right
of publicity in general; the focus of case law is on questions of which
characteristics are protected as "persona" because they identify the athlete.47
In the analysis of identifiability, courts have found the protection of one's
name to include protection of one's nickname.48 Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson &
Son, Inc. 49 is the leading case recognizing a publicity right protection of a
professional athlete's nickname. While playing football for the University of
Wisconsin-Madison, Elroy Hirsch earned the nickname "Crazylegs" for his
unique running style.50 The nickname stuck and Hirsch was known as
"Crazylegs" throughout his career as a professional athlete and as a coach. 51
During his career, not only was Hirsch known as "Crazylegs," but he also
made "a number of advertisements, in all of which he was identified as
'Crazylegs."' 52 The court first recognized a cause of action for appropriation
of a person's name within the Wisconsin law of privacy, noting:
The celebrity creates audience appeal not only through the substantive
achievements that bring him fame, but at the expense of the privacy
that he must surrender in becoming a public personality. It would be
ironic for a court to refuse to protect a celebrity's economic interest on
the grounds that he had surrendered any interest in privacy.53
The court went on to recognize that "athletes have a property right in their
47. See generally Stapleton & McMurphy, supra note 2.
48. Id. at 38.
49. 90 Wis. 2d 379 (1979).
50. Id. at 384.
51. Id. at384-86.
52. Id. at385.
53. Id. at 391 (quoting James M. Treece, Commericial Exploitation of Names, Likenesses, and
Personal Histories, 51 TEX. L. REV. 637, 646-47 (1973)).
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identities." 54 Ultimately, the court concluded:
The fact that the name, "Crazylegs," used by Johnson, was a nickname
rather than Hirsch's actual name does not preclude a cause of action.
All that is required is that the name clearly identify the wronged
person.... [And,] it is not disputed.., that the nickname identified
the plaintiff Hirsch.55
Thus, courts adopting the Hirsch decision have protected nicknames under
the right of publicity as encompassed within the concept of persona.
Next, courts recognized professional athletes' publicity rights as
assignable property rights in Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. v. Major League
Baseball Players Ass'n.56 Here, the court addressed the assignability of
publicity rights when Topps filed an antitrust suit against the Major League
Baseball Players Association (MLBPA), claiming the MLBPA illegally
restrained the market for the publicity rights of Major League baseball players
by acquiring and collectively managing the group publicity rights of the
players.57 Though in this particular decision the court did not specifically
address the assignability of the players' publicity rights, the court apparently
acquiesced to such assignability by means of the MLBPA's execution of it's
Commercial Authorization Agreements, because the court did not discuss the
agreements or their validity and moved directly to the antitrust analysis.58
Therefore, professional athletes can assign their publicity rights to licensees
for a specified use.
Finally, in Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 59 a court recently considered a
claim for infringement of publicity rights by appropriation of a former
professional baseball player's likeness in a beer advertisement. Donald
Newcombe, a former Major League Baseball All-Star, began playing in the
Negro leagues and moved to the majors, where he played from 1949 to
1960.60 In the majors he was a celebrated athlete who achieved many
honors. 61 Unfortunately, Newcombe struggled with alcohol problems and
considered himself a recovering alcoholic at the time of litigation. 62
54. Hirsch, 90 Wis. 2d at 397 (citing Judith Endejan, Comment, The Tort of Misappropriation of
Name or Likeness Under Wisconsin's New Privacy Law, 1978 WiS. L. REv. 1029, 1046).
55. Id.
56. 641 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
57. Id. at 1181-90.
58. Id. at 1181-92.
59. 157 F.3d 686 (9th Cir. 1998).
60. Id. at 689.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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Newcombe complained that an advertisement for Killian's Irish Red Beer, a
brand owned by Adolf Coors Co., featured a drawing of an "old-time baseball
game, ' 63 including a pitcher who was recognizable as Newcombe. 64 While
Coors denied that the advertisement used a likeness of Newcombe, it did admit
"that the drawing... was based on a newspaper photograph of Newcombe
pitching in the 1949 World Series."65 Newcombe claimed "the defendants
violated his [common law] right of privacy and.., his statutory rights under
Cal. Civ. Code § 3344" by using "his likeness and identity to their commercial
advantage." 66
In their analysis, the court reaffirmed the common law cause of action test
articulated in Eastwood v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County:67
To sustain a common law cause of action for commercial
misappropriation, a plaintiff must prove: "(1) the defendant's use of
the plaintiffs identity; (2) the appropriation of plaintiff's name or
likeness to defendant's advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) lack
of consent; and (4) resulting injury."68
In addition, the court found:
Cal. Civ. Code § 3344 provides in relevant part, "[a]ny person who
knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature, photograph, or
likeness, in any manner... for purposes of advertising.., without
such person's prior consent.., shall be liable for any damages
sustained by the person."69
Thus, the court found the identifiability of the likeness was the main issue
to be decided.70 In analyzing "readily identifiable," the court relied on the
definition in section 3344(b), which specifies that one is "readily identifiable
from a photograph 'when one who views the photograph with the naked eye
can reasonably determine that the person depicted in the photograph is the
63. Id.
64. Nevcombe, 157 F.3d at 689.
65. Id. at 690.
66. Id. at 691.
67. 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1983). In Eastwood, actor Clint Eastwood sought to overturn a verdict of
a lower court which sustained the demurrer of a tabloid newspaper on the basis that Eastwood failed
to state a cause of action for invasion of privacy through section 3344 of the California Civil Code
and California common law. This reviewing court found Eastwood had satisfied the elements
necessary to state a claim, as well as that the section 3344 exemption for incidental advertising of
media outlets themselves did not apply when the media outlet knowingly presented reckless
falsehoods in the advertising. See generally id.
68. Newcombe, 157 F.3dat 692 (citing Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 346.).
69. Id. (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a)).
70. Id.
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same person who is complaining of its unauthorized use.' 71
The court went on to find this definition appropriate for likenesses, as well
as for photographs. 72 The court also found that it would not be unreasonable
for a jury to find the drawing constituted a readily identifiable likeness of
Newcombe 73 and that "a direct connection [existed] between [him,] as the
central feature of the advertisement, and the commercial sponsorship of
Killian's Red." 74  Thus, courts adopting the Newcombe decision have
protected non-photographic physical likenesses of professional athletes, in
addition to protecting their right to profit from uses of their photographs.
In this manner the development of the professional athlete's right of
publicity has mirrored the general development of publicity rights and has
focused on identifiability of persona.
III. MEDIA'S FIRST AMENDMENT LIMITATIONS ON PUBLICITY RIGHTS
In the context of the development of publicity rights, the First Amendment
has emerged as a limitation to the claim of a right of publicity in every usage
of persona.75 It is important to first have a general understanding of the theory
of the First Amendment. Then, more specific applications can be explored.
A. First Amendment Theory
In the 1927 case Whitney v. California,76 Justice Brandeis listed three
purposes of the First Amendment: "(1) 'Enlightenment'-which encompasses
both political, social and scientific 'news' as well as 'entertainment'; (2) 'Self-
fulfillment'-the need for human self-expression in all forms; and (3) 'The
Safety Valve'-the societal need for free expression as an alternative for or
sublimation of social or political violence."7 7 One commentator has explained
the "enlightenment function" advocates access to information in order to make
informed opinions and choices; 78 the "self-fulfillment function" conceives of
self-expression as a "goal of the First Amendment;" 79 and, finally, the "safety-
71. Id. (citing CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344(b)(1)).
72. Id.
73. Neweombe, 157 F.3d at 693-94.
74. Id. at 694.
75. Stapleton & McMurphy, supra note 2, at 44.
76. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
77. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 8.2.
78. Id. § 8.3.
79. Id. § 8.7.
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valve function" advocates free speech to air alleged grievances and disputes. 80
In addition to the different rationales of the First Amendment, McCarthy
observes, "[tlhere is no 'equal protection' for all 'speech' within the First
Amendment. All 'speech' is not equal. [And] [a]s Nimmer observed, the
degree of protection given to 'speech' will turn upon the type of speech and its
content.' 81 In this context, observers Felcher and Rubin conceive of the
classification of media uses of human identity along a three segment spectrum:
"(1) 'news'-information about the real world; (2) 'stories'-fictionalized
information primarily designed to entertain; and (3) 'advertising'-uses which
clearly have the message 'buy me.' 82  Accordingly, First Amendment
protection decreases along the spectrum. 83  By these observations,
commentators have traditionally allowed varying degrees of First Amendment
protection to speech based upon the classification of the style of speech.
B. Application of First Amendment Theory
One commentator has explained, generally,
with a balancing between the property right of the right of publicity
and the policy of free speech, a given unauthorized use of a person's
identity will fall within one of two categories: the challenged use is
either "communicative" or "commercial." A "communicative" use is
one in which the policy of free speech predominates over the right of a
person to his identity, and no infringement of the right of publicity
takes place. A "commercial" use is one in which the right of publicity
is infiinged because while there are overtones of ideas being
communicated, the use is primarily commercial. 84
In addition to this general theory, pertinent statutory treatment of the right
of publicity has attempted to draw similar distinctions in the type of speech in
which one's persona is used.
First, due to California's extensive entertainment industry, that state has
developed such right of publicity legislation and, therefore, California Civil
Code Section 3344 provides a good example of such statutory language.
California Civil Code Section 3344 provides liability for "[a]ny person who
80. Id. § 8.8.
81. Id. § 8.13 (citing 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH §
2.07 (3d ed., rev. vol. 2001)).
82. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 8.13 (citing Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, Privacy,
Publicity and the Portrayal of Real People by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1597 (1979)).
83. Id.
84. MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 28:41 (citations omitted).
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knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in
any manner on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of
advertising or selling, or soliciting purchase of, products, merchandise, goods
or services, without such person's prior consent. 85 The Code goes on to
clarify that "a use of a name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness in
connection with any news, public affairs, or sports broadcast or account, or
any political campaign, shall not constitute a use for which consent is required
under... (a)." 86 The Code also provides that a prohibited use does not occur
"solely because the material containing such use is commercially sponsored or
contains paid advertising. Rather it shall be a question of fact whether...
[the] likeness was so directly connected with the commercial sponsorship or
with the paid advertising as to constitute a use [requiring] consent. '87
Basically, California Civil Code Section 3344 protects a person's right of
publicity in any use of his identity which facilitates profit by another. Section
3344 exempts, however, advertisements by news media of themselves from
publicity right infringement claims.
In a similar fashion, the Restatement declares: "One who appropriates the
commercial value of a person's identity by using without consent the person's
name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of trade is subject to
liability for the relief appropriate." 88 The Restatement goes on to clarify "for
purposes of trade" as a use
in advertising the user's goods or services, or [a use] on merchandise
marketed by the user, or ... in connection with services rendered by
the user. However, ... 'for purposes of trade" does not ordinarily
include the use of a person's identity in news reporting, commentary,
entertainment, works offiction or nonfiction, or in advertising that is
incidental to such uses.89
Essentially, in theory, "for purposes of trade" means the First Amendment
will not preempt publicity rights in infringement cases of use of persona in
advertising, but, the "First Amendment will preempt publicity rights when
persona is used in the context of news reporting, commentary, entertainment
or works of fiction and nonfiction." 90 Courts have attempted to distinguish
cases along these theoretical approaches by balancing the property interest of
85. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 1997) (emphasis added).
86. § 3344(d) (emphasis added).
87. § 3344(e).
88. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995) (emphasis added).
89. Id. § 47 (emphasis added).
90. MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 28:6.
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publicity rights against the interests of the First Amendment. 91
A case that clearly illustrates a court's attempt to distinguish between
"communicative" and "commercial" speech is Abdul-Jabbar v. General
Motors Corp.,92 the case brought by basketball star Kareem Abdul-Jabbar.
General Motors Corporation (GMC) ran a "television commercial aired during
the 1993 NCAA men's basketball tournament. 93 The ad featured a trivia
question which asked, "'Who holds the record for being voted the most
outstanding player of this tournament?' [and was answered by] the printed
words 'Lew Alcindor, UCLA, '67, '68, '69.' ' 94 Nothing in the advertisement
was untrue.95 Kareem Abdul-Jabbar's birth-name was Ferdinand Lewis
("Lew") Alcindor and during his college career he was known as Lew
Alcindor; however, he later legally changed his name to Kareem Abdul-Jabbar
and was known as such.96 In assessing the unauthorized use of Abdul-
Jabbar's name, the court rejected GMC's defense of a First Amendment
privilege in Abdul-Jabbar's athletic statistics as "communicative" speech, or
as "newsworthy," because, "[w]hile Lew Alcindor's basketball record may be
said to be "newsworthy," its use is not automatically privileged. GMC used
the information in the context of an automobile advertisement, not in a news
or sports account. ' 97 The inference then to be drawn is that blatant or
"traditional" advertising reclassifies otherwise "communicative" speech within
the realm of "commercial" speech and thus loses its First Amendment
protection.
Similarly, in Pooley v. National Hole-In-One Ass'n,98 though a golfer's
achievement of a hole-in-one shot worth one million dollars at a charity golf
event was originally newsworthy, that achievement's "subsequent
unauthorized reproduction was not automatically privileged simply
because... [it] continued to be a 'newsworthy' event."99 Here the court
found a promotional video tape which included the golfer's name and video
footage of his winning hole-in-one implied a false connection between the
golfer and the business since "[t]he use of the Plaintiffs name and videotape
footage was crucial to Defendant's commercial purpose of selling its
91. Id. § 28:41.
92. 85 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1996).
93. Id. at 409.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 409-10.
97. Abdul-Jabbar, 85 F.3d at 416.
98. 89 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (D. Ariz. 2000).
99. Id. at 1114.
2002]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW
fundraiser."' 00  Again, the "newsworthiness" of unauthorized uses of a
likeness is context-specific-when no longer presented in a context of
reporting of newsworthy events, the use no longer enjoys a First Amendment
privilege.
Similarly, in Cardtoons, L.L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n,
the court attempted to distinguish between "communicative" and
"commercial" speech in the context of parody, a stylistic speech.10' Cardtoons
produced parody baseball cards featuring Major League baseball players along
with commentary on the institution of baseball and baseball trading cards.
102
While the Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) argued an
infringement of the publicity rights licensed to it by its members and protected
by the specific Oklahoma publicity rights statute, 10 3 Cardtoons defended the
cards on grounds of First Amendment freedom of speech.
0 4
In its examination of the state statute, the court found two First
Amendment exceptions to the right of publicity: "The first, a 'news'
exception, exempts use of... identity in connection with any news, public
affairs, or sports broadcast or account, or any political campaign.... The
second exception.., exempts use in a commercial medium that is not directly
connected with commercial sponsorship or paid advertising."'
10 5
However, the court decided that the trading cards were "not commercial
speech-they do not merely advertise another unrelated product."'1 6 Instead,
the cards are a "commentary on these public figures and the major commercial
enterprise in which they work... [and] [t]he protections afforded by the First
Amendment... have never been limited to newspapers and books."' 0 7 Thus,
the cards were parody, which deserved First Amendment protection since they
"convey[ed] information about their subject and therefore constitute an
important means of expression."' 1 8 Presumably this parody expression, which
conveys information, is to be protected by the First Amendment since it
entertains while it conveys an opinion, arguably in order to assist the public at
large to form its own opinions in light of this information. By this view of the
parody cards, they should be protected by the First Amendment as speech that
100. Id. at 1113.
101. 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996).
102. Id. at 959-63.
103. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1449 (1986).
104. Cardtoons, L.L.C., 95 F.3d at 963-64.
105. Id. at 968 (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 1449(D), (F)).
106. Id. at 970.
107. Id. at 969.
108. Id.
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informs and is an original work that entertains.
However, just as equal protection of speech does not exist, nor does equal
protection of the style of speech exist. Ali v. Playgirl, Inc.109 involved
celebrated heavyweight boxer Muhammad Ali's claim for infringement of his
publicity rights by the publication of a parody caricature in defendant's
publication. In this case, the New York court narrowly construed the phrase
"purpose of trade" within Section 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law to
mean that a use was "not violative of [Section] 51 ... if it is 'in connection
with an item of news or one that is newsworthy."' 110 By this interpretation the
court found "no such informational or newsworthy dimension to [the]
unauthorized use." 111  The court ultimately found the establishment of a
"likelihood that [Ali would] prevail on his claim that his right of publicity
[had] been violated by the publication of the offensive portrait."' 12 Thus, the
same style of speech, parody, which enjoyed First Amendment protection in
Cardtoons was considered of infringement by an athlete's publicity rights in
Ali. Arguably, this inconsistency arose due to the court's emphasis in Ali on
the "offensive" nature of the likeness.
Aside from consideration of publicity rights in the context of particular
speech styles, namely parody, the United States Supreme Court has considered
the pure conflict between a plaintiff's pecuniary interests and the media's First
Amendment interests in reporting "newsworthy" events. 113 In Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broad. Co.,114 a "human cannonball" was performing his
fifteen-second routine at a state fair when a reporter videotaped the
performance, which was subsequently aired in its entirety on the evening
news. 
1 15
In its analysis of controlling law, the Court found the media would
generally be privileged to report, unrestrained, "newsworthy facts about [the]
petitioner's act."1 16 Accordingly, to remove the report of newsworthy facts to
become advertising, "there must be some closer and more direct connection,
beyond the mere fact that the newspaper itself is sold; and that the presence of
advertising.., in adjacent columns, or... duplication of a news item for the
109. 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
110. Id. at 727 (quoting Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 304 N.Y. 354,359 (1952)).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 728 (emphasis added).
113. Patti T. Cotten, Torts-The Right of Publicio-Protecting a Celebrity's Identity, 52 TENN.
L. REV. 123, 129-31 (1984) (citing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977)).
114. 433 U.S. 562.
115. Id. at 562-64.
116. Id. at574.
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purpose of advertising the publication itself."' 1 7 In addition, the Court found
that when deciding between protected or unprotected media reports, the First
Amendment does "not immunize the media when they broadcast a performer's
entire act without his consent."1 18 Most importantly, the Court determined:
The broadcast of a film of petitioner's entire act poses a substantial
threat to the economic value of that performance[,] ... [which] lies in
the 'right of exclusive control over the publicity given to his
performance[,]' [since] if the public can see [it for] free on television,
it will be less willing to pay to see it at the fair. 119
The majority went on to declare that the broadcast of the entire
performance "goes to the heart of petitioner's ability to earn a living as an
entertainer."' 120 Thus, since this case does not involve "the appropriation of an
entertainer's reputation to enhance the attractiveness of a commercial product,
but the appropriation of the very activity by which the entertainer acquired his
reputation in the first place,"'121 it is, arguably, truly a claim for a "right of
publicity."'122 Therefore, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear
that while the broadcast, and presumably the publication, of newsworthy facts
of a performer's act enjoys First Amendment protection, the performer's
publicity rights will trump First Amendment claims to the broadcast, and
publication, of the performance in its entirety.
Related to the publication or broadcast of newsworthy events is the
publication of those events in incidental advertising for the particular media
outlet. In Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc.,123 a court specifically
addressed a professional football player's publicity rights in such incidental
advertising. Joe Montana, an accomplished professional football quarterback
for the San Francisco 49ers, led his team to an unprecedented four Super Bowl
championships in one decade. 124 After each of the last three Super Bowl
victories, the San Jose Mercury News (SJMN) featured front-page stories
featuring the victories and photographs from the game of players, including
Montana.125 After the fourth Super Bowl win, SJMN printed, sold and
distributed posters featuring an artist's rendition of the newspaper cover
117. Id. at 575 n.11 (quoting WILLIAM PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 806-07 (4th ed. 1971)).
118. Id. at 575.
119. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 575.
120. Id. at 576.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639 (1995).
124. Id. at 640.
125. Id.
[Vol. 12:885
STOP THE PRESSES!
stories. 126 Montana claimed these posters infringed upon his right of publicity
and SJMN defended on First Amendment grounds. 127 First, the court found
that the exemption from claims of publicity right infringement for uses of
likeness "in connection with an item of news" 128 extended to other
communications media, including posters. 129 More importantly, the court
determined the existence of a First Amendment protection for a truthful use of
likeness in advertising to promote a protected medium (a news medium). 130
Here, the court found the poster, including Montana's likeness, was
published because of its depiction of a newsworthy sports event, as well as the
fact it was a depiction of a protected news medium for promotion of that
medium.131 Therefore, the court specifically addressed the First Amendment's
limitation on rights of publicity in the case of incidental advertising of a
protected medium.
Finally, in ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc.,132 a United States District
Court addressed a claim for infringement of a right of publicity in the context
of an artistic rendition. In this case, Tiger Woods, by his licensing agent,
claimed a violation of his publicity rights and trademark rights by way of an
artists production of a series of prints entitled "The Masters of Augusta,"
which featured a likeness of Tiger Woods and included his name on the print
and in an informational pamphlet included with the print. 133 The defendant
claimed a First Amendment protection of the prints as artwork which does not
constitute commercial speech and which expresses "the majesty of a
newsworthy moment." 134 Exclusive of the trademark infringement claims, the
court opined that "the right of publicity.., does not authorize a celebrity to
prevent the use of her name in an expressive work protected by the First
Amendment." 135  The court also declared that since visual art "always
communicate[s] some idea or concept to those who view it' 136 it enjoys First
Amendment protection, which is not compromised when offered for sale. 137
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Montana, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 641.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 642.
131. Id. at641.
132. 99 F. Supp. 2d 829 (N.D. Ohio 2000).
133. Id. at 829-3 1.
134. Id. at 834.
135. Id. (citations omitted).
136. Id. at 836 (citations omitted).
137. ETW Corp., 99 F. Supp. 2d at 835.
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By this analysis the court found the defendant's prints enjoy First Amendment
protections, which limited plaintiffs publicity rights.1 38
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT CASE LAW FOR THE FUTURE OF
PROFESSIONAL ATHLETE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY CLAIMS
Arguably, the preceding discussion does little to clarify the current state of
First Amendment limitations of the publicity rights of professional athletes.
The varied decisions make it difficult to discern any noticeable judicial trend
striking a balance between these conflicting rights. While courts have
attempted to draw distinctions in the type of speech implicated, or in the
character of the use of the likeness implicated, and to relate those implications
to each other, the courts have not successfully articulated a clear distinction,
other than perhaps that the claim should be assessed on a fact-specific basis.
As a preliminary matter, Zacchini,-arguably as the only Supreme Court
opinion directly on-point-is the only clear-cut decision regarding a pure case
of conflict of publicity and First Amendment interests. The Supreme Court
focused extensively on the use of the plaintiffs performance, in its entirety.
Therefore, professional athletes may, fairly confidently, assert a right of
publicity that would trump the media's First Amendment interests when the
publication or broadcast depicts an entire athletic performance.
Next, Abdul-Jabbar and Pooley attempt to classify speech as
"communicative" (i.e., "newsworthy") or as "commercial." In doing so they
highlight the context-specific nature of these classifications, since what may
initially be benign, communicative speech in the form of biographical
information or career statistics or achievements becomes commercial speech
when placed in a advertisement. By this analysis, professional athletes may
sometimes enforce their publicity rights in their "stats," but it depends on the
circumstances.
Likewise, with Cardtoons and Ali courts split on the scope of an athlete's
publicity rights when his likeness is used in a parody. Arguably, unlike
Cardtoons, which involved parody in what is likely a commercial product,
baseball trading cards, the speech at issue in Ali appeared in a more traditional
medium, a magazine (though a pornographic magazine). However, just as in
Cardtoons, the parody style of "communicative" speech is in contention;
though lacking direct connection with "news" material, the parody caricature
was neither advertising nor endorsing other products, though advertisements
also appeared in the magazine. Arguably, the specific medium in which the
parody appeared, and not the parody speech style itself, was determinative of
138. Id. at 834-35.
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the lack of First Amendment protection. Therefore, professional athletes may
not profit from the use of their likeness in a parody, though the parody may or
may not possess some degree of commercial purpose. Again, the
determination will be case-specific.
Finally, in the case of artistic impression of a newsworthy event, the
professional athlete's right of publicity will be limited by the artist's First
Amendment interests in freedom of expression, even though the artistic work
may be sold for profit. This seems to be the most glaring example of conflict
between the personal property right of publicity and the right of free
expression. However, the force behind the right of publicity is one's inherent
pecuniary interest in his persona. An artist producing, on a somewhat "mass"
scale, a rendering of the athlete's athletic achievement allows the artist to
profit from the athlete's efforts, while the athlete himself does not share in
those same profits from his own effort. Again, the context is determinative.
Courts have yet to offer truly concrete definitions of First Amendment
protected speech which limit a professional athlete's rights of publicity in his
own persona and achievements. Decisions have mixed "commercial" and
"communicative" classifications of the use of a likeness of a professional
athlete. However, this means of distinction has created further confusion in
the area of publicity rights. This confusion leaves athletes susceptible to
diminished returns on their own efforts.
One more appropriate means of distinguishing uses of likeness, as either
subject to right of publicity claims by professional athletes or as protected uses
under the First Amendment, would be to distinguish the use based upon the
medium in which it appears, subject to the Zacchini exception. Therefore,
claims for infringement of publicity rights should be judged based upon the
medium in which the athlete's likeness appears. This distinction by type of
medium would reconcile Cardtoons and Ali, as well as clarify situations like
that in ETW. This distinction by medium would also harmonize with the
Restatement, which calls for the prohibition of unauthorized uses of one's
likeness in commercial products.139
By this analysis, the Cardtoons and Ali decisions would be reversed.
Cardtoons' trading cards are arguably commercial products, which happen to
make a social commentary. Therefore, they should be subject to right of
publicity claims. And, Ali's picture appears in a medium whose purpose is to
convey ideas and opinions. Therefore, despite the perceived undesirable
nature of the magazine's contents, the social commentary appears in a medium
that is not a commercial product, but a medium whose purpose is to convey
139. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 46-49 (1995).
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speech, ideas, and opinions. Similarly, though likenesses such as those in
ETW convey a newsworthy event, the likeness appears in what is arguably a
commercial medium since it is not created as a single work of art for the sake
of art, but as a product to be sold in a commercial market-the market for
sports images.
Thus, by analysis based upon classification by medium, use of a
professional athlete's likeness in advertising and on commercial products
would be limited by the athlete's publicity rights. This, of course, would be
limited by Zacchini. Accordingly, any use in a medium of communication-a
non-advertising medium or a commercial product-would enjoy First
Amendment protection, unless it conveyed the "entire athletic performance"
(which may require a more concrete definition by the court). Thus,
distinctions of uses based upon the "commercial" or "communicative" nature
of the use should be abandoned.
Distinction of uses of likeness, which are either subject to publicity rights
of athletes or are protected uses under the First Amendment, should be made
based upon the type of medium in which the likeness appears. By this
analysis, it is clear that likenesses appearing in advertisements or on
commercial products would be subject to right of publicity claims by
professional athletes, and that uses appearing in media of a purely
communicative nature-those media designed to convey information, non-
advertising media, or commercial products-would enjoy First Amendment
protection subject only to the Zacchini exception.
V. CONCLUSION
The right of publicity was born of common law privacy rights and
flourished under property law analysis. Arguably, a professional athlete's
most valuable asset is himself. Publicity rights allow the athlete to profit from
the development of his persona. However, the First Amendment may, in
certain situations, allow the media to infringe upon those rights by the
uncompensated use of the professional athlete's persona.
Currently, case law does not clearly delineate uses that enjoy First
Amendment protection as opposed to those uses subject to claims of publicity
right infringement. The current law attempts to make such distinctions based
upon classifications of the uses as either "commercial" or "communicative."
This means of distinction is inadequate, as it has not produced a clear measure
of when professional athletes enjoy a right of publicity in the use of their
likeness.
A better distinction could be made based upon the classification of the
medium in which the likeness appears, rather than based upon the
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classification of the use of the likeness. Distinction based upon the
classification of the medium in which the likeness appears -would provide a
clear indication of protected uses, reconcile the current case law opinions, and
comport with the Restatement.140
Definitively, any appearances of likeness in advertisements or on
commercial products would be subject to right of publicity claims. All uses of
likenesses appearing in media of communication-media that convey
information and opinions for sale in the marketplace, exclusive of
advertisements and of products-would enjoy First Amendment protection, as
long as the use did not convey the entire athletic performance. By this
analysis the right of publicity more accurately protects the athlete's ability to
profit from the use of his persona, just as the right is intended.
ERIKA T. OLANDER
140. Id.
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